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So give us your.
You know sort of some nation of how well they all looking right now.
Sure things are -- and a program Jonathan.
I was involved in training the Afghan army the Afghan police and elements -- where it's called the Afghan national directorate of security he kind of -- -- as the the Afghan version of the FBI and CIA -- -- the one organization.
In the province called Bosnia which is about.
Two provinces south of Kabul are on a good day it's a six hour drive and a bad it could take several days to get there.
The Afghan army from my perspective was actually progressing phenomenally well -- -- been actively involved in training the army.
-- since 2002.
The army soldiers that we work where -- where aggressive.
-- trustworthy we didn't feel that there -- any type of.
Taliban infiltration of those forces they -- Thoroughly capable of handling any mission that we asked them to do.
The Afghan police was a different story.
And what a lot you -- know is that the Afghan police from 2002 until 2006.
We're trained by the Germans and the Germans were supposed to talk about about 80000 Afghan police officers.
Well the Internet training about 600 guys to be cops that could operate in the European Union.
To -- people got to remember that Afghanistan doesn't -- -- even functioning telephone system so there's no way for you call 911 if you need a police officer.
Let alone they really don't need police officers that can operate in the EU they need people who can basically keep the peace on the local street corner.
So it -- up happening -- in 2006.
The State Department took over the training in the Afghan please.
And they contract it out that turn into a company called -- core.
Di Carlo into golf Louis police officers and put in through a two week basic training program.
And the result of that was that most of the police officers defected stopped going to work just never showed up so in 2007.
NATO take over the training of the Afghan police and is now under a program called the NATO mission training program Afghanistan -- And MTA.
This is that Tyne -- been trying to train the Afghan police in the same standards of the Afghan army.
The problem is from my perspective is that were about 78 years too late to the fight with the Afghan police and what we've found is that.
They are easily infiltrated by the Taliban -- of their loyalty is suspect.
They have a tendency to abandon their posts there usually the least aren't the least paid.
So those -- the guys were actually the front line you know.
Person that an average out average Afghan is gonna be -- with -- when you're talking about.
Having the relationship between Afghan citizen and a member of the government the chances are that the person that they're dealing with on and most common most often basis -- a cop.
So that -- -- today.
If if if we don't -- the police of doing particularly well we think the army's okay.
How do you see day one when the lost American troops combat troops have withdrawn from Afghanistan.
How does it begin to play out of the Taliban just sitting -- biding their time right now and doing these occasional attacks is mentioned the one we sort of the hotel.
Last week does it all go to chaos within -- Of us leaving.
-- sit -- -- with the Taliban put out on their press releases to that actually a really good and they're very media savvy organization they think they're winning.
On and you know -- -- their standard of how they're measuring the game if they're in the war -- a -- they're basically greedy on their ability to continue to conduct.
These high profile attacks and urban areas.
So long as we have a presence there and then after we leave that's when the real war for them is gonna start.
-- it really kind of does this can if the Afghan army can -- -- act together and can fight as a cohesive force at an account and I'm gonna have.
Quite a surprise on their hands dead real question then becomes is.
How do we continue to supply the Afghan army because that's the one area whether they're not capable yet -- -- being able to operate on their -- They can't.
They can't find themselves they can't equip their soldiers.
On their -- they need international support.
But if you.
If for some reason we aren't able to equip the Afghan army if they're not able to find that equipment I think what you find -- you have a couple of months of the Afghan army really taking the fight to the Taliban.
And then what you'll start to see is fracturing of Afghanistan -- -- back into what the state of it was prior to 2001.
We'll have an alliance in the north that's dedicated to fighting against the deep.
A posh tune -- force I even Taliban in the south.
And you'll probably find that we've left a very well equipped and very well trained Afghan army.
And so what I was always afraid of with the Afghan kernels that we talked to would have large.
Warehouses full of equipment that they -- they had not handed out their troops and -- -- you'll what are you doing with -- Let me look at us and they smile they feel this is for wouldn't you guys -- -- think I'm gonna talk by itself right I can see I think we.
What worked what -- my theory is and I think a lot of my fellow you know trainers there are -- -- that.
If we leave one day and the Afghan army does not quite as a cohesive unit we got a bunch of colonels they get real.
Ground level commander troops not the generally Afghan army -- -- the -- these could be the future warlords or they're the ones who are sitting on the stockpiles of arms and their little ones.
That have a loyalty of their men and dressing.
-- it and David Lawson writing in here one of our view is that captain says.
The only question I have as a vet is when did this when -- our soldiers become nation builders.
Is that a -- point have we done too much nation building -- a week to week changing the role.
That -- troops playing over -- -- that the right role for them to be playing well.
I didn't talk to anybody who served as a train very good known.
-- that -- is drawn the nor had over Hillary is that we're not nation builders that we have to have the Afghans lead every mission.
So in that sense of the Afghans wanna go out and build a school they wanna go out and dig a well for somebody they wanna go out.
And did -- road and they need our support to do that all we're doing is we're responding to requests from our Afghan allies of the Afghan allies.
Want to do would nation building on their own and they just -- -- wouldn't you don't give him some advice help them provide some security I think that's an adequate role for us to play -- Captain there -- another viewer writing in the questioning how well the Obama administration is full this war.
Would indeed with the disagreement solemn policy I mean I imagine in every administration on something as big as good decisions as big as wall.
That is disagreements and they don't necessarily.
-- fact -- they don't necessary damage the -- by double but do you think from the Bush Administration.
Through the Obama administration we hopeful this more in the best way possible.
Now I think the Bush Administration lost.
Site of what was important in Afghanistan when achieve its yesterday focus the bulk of our military forces and thinking towards Iraq.
I think the Obama administration has admitted -- a profound shift in strategy by ending the war in Iraq and then taking what was -- you know.
The bulk of our forces our strategic thinking that was focused on Iraq and put it toward Afghanistan I can give a prime example of that.
When I landed in Afghanistan and April 2008 we sat down at a dinner with.
And he said he asked everybody in the room please raise your hand if you if you've served in Iraq and Catherine hands went up nation I want you to understand something right now.
This is not Iraq in Iraq we do everything we must to win.
Here in Afghanistan or doing everything we can't that was 2008 and we -- Afghanistan at that point eight years.
That's a profound statement on what at least the bush administration's focus was towards the Afghan war.
The Obama administration I think has inherited a war that is you know nine years on from the start -- their administration they've done their best to refocus the policy.
But -- had been nine years a previous engagement to sort of dictate what the conditions on the ground war.
Very interesting points captain Matt Zelaya thank you very much -- -- -- captains and articles.
Is the also all of the book -- she is it without time not all about his experiences in Afghanistan.
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