Also in this playlist...
This transcript is automatically generated
We'll be NSA director now defending the effectiveness.
Of his agency's surveillance program.
But general Keith Alexander is also issuing one key warning about the leaking.
Of this classified information by -- notice.
-- -- -- -- -- How damaging is this to the national security of the American people.
That this trust was -- I think it was irreversible and significant damage to this nation.
Has this helped America's.
I don't believe it has not believe -- will hurt us and our allies.
And interesting exchange there.
We're glad to be joined this morning by Michael Chertoff who of course is former Homeland Security secretary.
Also a former federal judge and the chairman co-founder of the Chertoff group welcome good gray -- here this mornings are welcome -- -- -- -- so what do you think about that I mean do you believe that this leak has made us less safe in this country.
I think it has had a disaster for a couple of reasons first in more detail.
That you put out about these programs the more you give terrorists and other adversaries -- road map.
To minimize your exposure to our intelligence collection.
And dealing with terrorism.
Are getting intelligence and information is the key to -- and that's where prevents -- and restart testimony yesterday that.
Described fifty instances in which globally.
Plots have been disrupted these kinds of collection activities.
The second that you guys it undermines confidence.
On the part of our allies about our bill our ability to keep our important matters secret and that also hurts.
Our cooperation global.
You know -- that's clearly an issue you know what one of the larger sort of bit venues here we look at this discussion.
Is whether or not they were reaching a bit yesterday to validate this program because you hear the critics say look.
You know the fifty instances that you mention forty of those war.
-- more minor incidents that happened overseas.
There's also suggestions that a number of the is that were uncovered were based in FBI sting operations and other -- That there were so many other factors that allowed us to get to where we got a -- That that the surveillance program really was not the key thing.
-- -- -- the challenges dealing with any.
Effort after the fact to figure out what caused us to be able to unravel plot action right -- President Obama.
Made the -- in his interview recently.
That you can never say that any particular technique was critical.
It's all part of a mosaic it's all part of our -- of -- number of things that you hope will give you weren't.
The problem is as you start to abandon those techniques you begin to increase the risk.
I'm an attack and minimize -- possibly intercepting it.
Charlotte you want to play games with the safety the American people and try to make it as much of a cliffhanger is possible and you never want to sacrifice a program that is proven to give.
Valuable intelligence information.
-- a stand up but you know a lot of people look at for example what happened in Boston or what happened import head.
Right and they say look there was communication going on.
Overseas communication going on in these cases these people on the Internet they -- on YouTube they -- On cell phones so it seems in those cases that they were tailor made really to have been picked up by this program.
You know -- -- know it is that not a good test case should we not also look at the failures and say.
Why did we found this case is this is a whole thing too broad perhaps.
Why did take the Boston -- yeah actually that's an illustration of some of the limitations.
That we put on our programs that he had -- -- had to American citizens or one American citizen and a legal permanent resident and measures made clear yesterday.
That's precisely the category people they can't be routinely monitored.
And whom you can't constantly serve jail so in -- way the Boston case illustration.
That we haven't done certain things we might do because of legal restrictions.
But not -- -- my own experience to kind of data you can pick up.
From this kind of program.
Is enormously -- -- disrupting -- you know we went back after 9/11.
When I was secretary we looked at whether this kind of data.
Would have allowed us to identify the 9/11 hijackers.
Head of the attacks on September 11.
And the answer is it would have connected up about fifteen of the nineteen hijackers.
-- that was just it was not just found out it was travel data as well.
But it shows you the power of this kind of information in preventing -- So does it concern you when you look at the efficiency of the system you know I think it could have gone to a judge to get back to Channel Islands and I haven't had luck.
The Russians have warned us about this guy we need a little bit more latitude in this case I cannot imagine a judge that would turn that down given all of those circumstances.
You know and and you look at for example the 9/11.
Examples that you point to.
It back kind of focus on on these people what I mean judges as we know the by the court has been very flexible when asked to have a little more latitude -- with these in these cases.
-- and -- I mean I think once you've identified a red flag or somebody that you need to look at that.
-- it is possible to get out permission from the court absolutely.
I think the challenge where they're resilient terminal and back -- and I have case.
Is why it is that -- information from Russia did not trigger and more intensive investigation yeah but that's separate from this program.
This program is not designed to be the end of investigation.
-- is designed to do is allow you look at a broad range of data.
And I identify out of that short range a couple of -- in the haystack that warrant a closer look.
But then you have to go to the court and get permission to get that closer look.
Microshaft thank you very much great to have your -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Filter by section